Since Obamacare, Waiting Lists For Care For Disabled People Have Grown 40 Percent
Enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 marked the most important accomplishment in U.S. health care reform in decades. Not since Medicare and Medicaid were passed in 1965 have so many Americans been given access to insurance coverage for their health care. Though the goal of universal health care was not achieved, ACA brought coverage to millions of uninsured Americans and provided assurance to the already-insured that if they lost their insurance through job loss or job change, they could turn to an expanded Medicaid program or a government-subsidized insurance policy for affordable coverage.
But while ACA has had a major impact on the U.S. health care system, its promise has been limited by its design. Rather than replacing the U.S. system with a more effective, less costly, and politically sustainable model, lawmakers decided to build on top of an inefficient, expensive, and politically insecure, existing model. A health care system that rested on a shaky foundation now has to carry more weight and that makes for an unstable future. Indeed, we are already starting to see some unraveling of ACA. For ACA to achieve its goals in a durable fashion, it should be replaced by a health care program that provides the same kind of health care coverage for all Americans rather than relying on a system that mixes employer-based insurance with individually-purchased private insurance and government-provided coverage.
Coverage Gains Among Higher-Income People Suggest the ACA’s Individual Mandate Had Big Effects on CoverageJune 1, 2018
If the probability that the mandate caused an uninsured person to obtain coverage was the same at all income levels (with narrow exceptions described in the paper), then the paper’s estimates imply that the mandate reduced the number of uninsured people by 8.0 million in 2016, as reported in Table 5 of the paper. Even if the individual mandate’s effect on people with family incomes below 400 percent of the FPL was half as large, then the mandate reduced the overall number of uninsured people by 4.6 million in 2016.
Prior to full implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, states had taken the leading role in regulating individual health insurance markets. The ACA’s regime of subsidies, penalties, and federal regulations made individual coverage more accessible to those with moderate incomes and those with preexisting medical conditions. Premiums for such coverage, however, doubled between 2013 and 2017, leading to turmoil in individual markets. Both Congress and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) sought to grant states more authority to stabilize their markets through a waiver process established by section 1332 of the ACA. These efforts fell short. Congress did not enact significant changes to the ACA, and few states obtained CMS approval for section 1332 waivers to stabilize their markets. This paper offers several recommendations for streamlining and improving that waiver process that would provide states with more tools to stabilize individual markets.
We study the impact of deportation fear on the incomplete take-up of federal safety net programs in the United States. We exploit changes in deportation fear due to the roll-out and intensity of Secure Communities (SC), an immigration enforcement program administered by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) from 2008 to 2014. The SC program empowers the federal government to check the immigration status of anyone arrested by local law enforcement agencies and has led to the issuance of over two million detainers and the forcible removal of approximately 380,000 immigrants. We estimate the spillover effects of SC on Hispanic citizens, finding significant declines in ACA sign-ups and food stamp take-up, particularly among mixed-status households and areas where deportation fear is highest. In contrast, we find little response to SC among Hispanic households residing in sanctuary cities. Our results are most consistent with network effects that perpetuate fear rather than lack of benefit information or stigma.
We examine how the Affordable Care Act’s dependent coverage mandate (DCM) affected young adults’ time allocation. Exploiting more accurate measures from the American Time Use Surveys, we find that the DCM reduced labor supply. The question then arises, what have these adults done with the extra time? Estimates suggest a reduction in job‐lock, as well as in the duration of the average doctor’s visit, including time spent waiting and receiving care. The latter effect is consistent with substitution from emergency‐department utilization toward more routine care. Estimates suggest that the extra time has gone into socializing, and into educational and job‐search activities.
This article investigates the impact on the U.S. economy of making health care more affordable. We compare health care cost reductions with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) using a rich life cycle general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We evaluate a wide range of cost reductions ranging from 0.64% (realistic and feasible) to 29.5% (equivalence with OECD). Our results show that the ACA is more effective in reducing uninsured population than all cost reductions considered. This result holds throughout the life cycle and for the most fragile part of the population: the poorest, the less educated, and those with bad health. Realistic and feasible cost reductions are less welfare improving than the ACA. The increase of welfare induced by the reform is around 7.8 times higher than the increase provided by cost reductions. Besides, the poorer are more benefited than the richer after the reform, while the opposite occurs after cost reductions. Finally, to obtain the same welfare increase of the ACA, medical costs have to decrease by 5.21%, a very hard task. These results provide support for the ACA against opponents who might present cost reductions as alternatives.
This study contributes to the literature on supply-side adjustments to insurance expansions by examining the effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on ambulance response times. Exploiting temporal and geographic variation in the implementation of the ACA as well as pre-treatment differences in uninsured rates, we estimate that the expansions of private and Medicaid coverage under the ACA combined to slow ambulance response times by an average of 19%. We conclude that, through extending coverage to individuals who, in its absence, would not have availed themselves of emergency medical services, the ACA added strain to emergency response systems.
An additional 24 million people had individually purchased guaranteed-renewable coverage (HIPAA required all non-short-term individual market plans to be guaranteed renewable). Such plans protected enrollees from premium spikes if they developed expensive conditions, were more secure than employer plans for patients with expensive conditions, and faced incentives to make plans attractive to the sick as well as not to renege on their commitments to the sick. Hundreds of millions of Americans once had the freedom to enroll in guaranteed-renewable plans but lost that choice when Obamacare outlawed them. A study by McKinsey and Company for the Department of Health and Human Services shows provider networks in individual-market plans have narrowed significantly since 2013, when the breadth of networks reflected actual consumer preferences.
This EBRI Notes article examines the percentage of employers offering health insurance from 2008–2016 to better understand how health insurance offer rates may have been affected by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), the Great Recession of 2007–2009, and the subsequent economic recovery. The data come from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey–Insurance Component (MEPS-IC).
Many employers were expected to drop workplace health insurance with the introduction of the ACA. Since 2008, the percentage of coverage-offering employers with 1,000 or more employees has been consistently near or above 99 percent—it reached 99.8 percent in 2016—but smaller firms have shown a steady, though not precipitous, decline in offer rates. For the smallest employers studied, those with fewer than 10 employees, the offer rate declined from 22.7 percent in 2015 to 21.7 percent in 2016.
But over the last year, perhaps with the strengthening economy and lower unemployment rates, there is evidence of what may be a rebound in employment-based coverage offer rates among firms with 10-999 employees. More specifically, from 2015-2016:
For employers with 10–24 employees, those offering health benefits increased from 48.9 percent to 49.4 percent.
For employers with 25–99 employees, those offering health benefits increased from 73.5 percent to 74.6 percent.
For employers with 100-999 employees, those offering health benefits increased from 95.1 percent to 96.3 percent. For these employers, this trend actually began a year earlier, when the offer rate increased from 92.5 percent in 2014 to 95.1 percent in 2015.
This paper discusses the context for the recent rebound and suggests factors that may influence future trends.